This paper investigates civil conflict as a product of the survival strategies of African leaders. Specifically, the paper offers a theory of risk substitution that predicts coup-fearing leaders will undermine the military effectiveness of the state when making effort to extend their own tenure. While "coup-proofing" practices have often been noted as contributors to political survival, considerably less attention has considered the influence of these strategies on other forms of conflict. Utilizing data from a number of cross-national datasets, the analyses show that having a higher number of "coup-proofing" counterweights significantly worsens a state's security prospects, specifically in regards to civil conflict. A brief consideration of multiple episodes of conflict further suggests that in addition to coup-proofing undermining the counterinsurgency capacity of the state, some leaders are simply indifferent to--or can even potentially benefit from--the existence of an insurgency.
actually increase the likelihood of the onset of civil conflict. The paper proceeds with a brief discussion of the different threats that leaders face, a review of scholarly literature related to negative consequences of coup-proofing, a discussion of the implications of coup-proofing for civil conflict, and finally a multivariate assessment of the hypothesis. The results strongly support the contention that coup-proofing, while undermining coups, significantly increases the likelihood that regimes will become more vulnerable to civil conflict.
DIVERGENT PRIORITIES
Leaders face survival threats manifested by different types of actors, as diverse as foreign invaders, popular uprisings, military coups, armed insurgents, and even an electorate.Leaders would, no doubt, prefer to have a blanket policy that will stamp out any threat to their continued tenure.Unfortunately, the multitude of threats and the different actors that a leader must consider will force him or her to make trade-offs.In the end, a policy that increases security against one set of actors might decrease security against another, as executives engage in a balancing act for political survival. Feaver, for example, has pointed to a civil-military "problematique" in which efforts to increase the international security of the state by building up military prowess can actually increase the likelihood of a praetorian threat to the executive. 3 Leaders thus find themselves mired in a paradox in which a weak military can leave them vulnerable to invasion or civil war, while a strong military could expedite their exit through a coup d'état. This paper presents evidence that efforts to inhibit coups increases the risk of civil war as a general trend.
To return to the first part of Fearon's query: leaders do take money and build "crack units, presidential guards, or strong and loyal army divisions." Aside from obvious historical and contemporary examples, a large cross-national study by Belkin and Schofer has quantitatively demonstrated that regimes at higher risk of a coup possess morecoup-proofing units. 4 More recently, Pilster and Bohmelt have shown authoritarian regimes, who are presumably more likely to fear a coup than democracies, to be statistically more likely to have higher numbers of these organizations, 5 while Powell showed that a stronger structural coup-proofing apparatus significantly reduced the likelihood of coups being attempted, as well as the prospects of a coup's success. 6 This literature suggests that coup-fearing leaders will build up their coup-proofing apparatus, election-fearing leaders will be restrained from doing so, and coup-proofing can successfully reduce coup activity. So in contrast to the generalization that many leaders are failing to buildup their security apparatus, there is considerable evidence that leaders have already tried to stabilize their governments against coups.It would then seem paradoxical that in spite of concerted coup-proofing efforts and the decline in frequency of military coups in Africa, civil wars such as the M23 rebellion have continued to plague the region.This paper suggests that this trend is because leaders have only built up a specific aspect of their security apparatus: its counter-coup capabilities. Less attention is given to the regular armed forces that will ultimately be tasked with counterinsurgency.
COUP-PROOFING AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS
To address the second part of Fearon's question, it is important to clarify that efforts to address the first concern (coups) canincrease vulnerability to the second concern (rebellion) by changing the balance of capabilities between the state and its dissidents. First, coup-proofing increases the capacity of the opposition to engage in conflict against the regime. Roessler, for example, shows thatleaders in Africahave increased the mobilizational capacity of non-state actors when they purge disloyal elements from the government. 7 If there is one shortcoming of his effort, it could perhaps be that the influence of these purges is understated. Due to data availability, Roessler ultimately relies on the exclusion of ethnic groups frompolitical power.
Previous access to the government will no doubt make a population more powerful than the typical non-state group, but this dynamic could be even stronger when we consider survival strategies Second, a growing literature shows coup-proofing also decreases the military capabilities of the state. 8 For example,Powell has shown that coup-proofed militaries are less likely to be utilized in international conflict, 9 while Pilster and Bohmelt demonstrated that more heavily coup-proofed armies suffer a higher casualty rate than their adversaries on the battlefield. 10 A number of causes have been linked to these trends. First, fractionalization of the armed forces will create coordination challenges for the army just as they will for coup conspiracies. These Second, coup-proofing further reduces military capabilities by reducing materiel or redirecting it to the coup-proofing apparatus. For example, Siaka Stevens was able to peacefully retain power for 17 years in Sierra Leone while relying on a paramilitary organization for his personal survival. While his Internal Security Unit (ISU) was for years given "special attention"
with Cuban advisers, modern weaponry, and financial spoils, Stevens would eventually disarm the regular armed forces. 13 Other armies might be provided with sophisticated arms, but lack the training or upkeep to effectively utilize them. Returning to the war with Chad, the Libyans deployed "far more advanced and far more powerful weaponry…but were crushed nonetheless." 14 The FAZ under Mobutu similarly showed "costly equipment…proved of little value" in combat. 15 Henk and Rupiya's assessment of African military establishments concludes that such trends are due to two reasons. 16 First, financial resources are frequently dedicated to officer allowances, as illustrated with the estimated 68% of military expenditures that went to personnel allowances in Zimbabwe. While perhaps effective at keeping otherwise disgruntled officers in the barracks, high salaries will of course have limited utility in counterinsurgency.
Second, funding that is actually dedicated to procuring arms is often done for merely symbolic purposes, usually in an effort to show a façade of modernization of the armed forces or to increase their prestige. 17 So while Henk and Rupiya have suggested that Robert Mugabe's has a "relatively sophisticated procurement establishment," most of its military vehicles are actually inoperable.
Third, coup-proofing brings with it a reduction in quality of the regular armed forces.
Sekou Touré, though building up his National Militia, would appoint illiterate soldiers as commanding officers in the Guinean Army. 18 Siaka Stevens, in the extremely common practice of ethnically motivated recruitment, preferred the Limba and Temne and regardless of military competence readily purged anyone with suspect loyalty from Sierra Leon's armed forces. Given a combination of capability-reducing aspects of his survival strategy, it is no surprise that the state would eventually become susceptible to rebellion.
Accompanying these dynamics are an observe unwillingness to utilize the coup-proofing apparatus for counter-insurgency measures. Armed counterweights such as the Division Spéciale Présidentielle (DSP), the Garde Civile, and the gendarmerie possessed better training and resources than the regular army under Mobutu, though he steadfastly refused to deploy these paratroopers during Shaba or the first Congo War. The Garde Républicaine fits the mold under Kabila.Under both leaders, the regular armed forces have displayed a remarkable inability to waged counterinsurgency while the more skilled paramilitary remains removed from fighting.
These factors lead to the hypothesis to be tested in the following analyses:coup-proofing is expected to significantly increase the likelihood of civil conflict. The following sections describe and testan empirical assessment of the theory.
DATA AND METHODS
Civil conflict is defined as a "contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battlerelated deaths in a year," as reported in the Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD). 19 One of these parties is required to be the government. The first year of a new conflict acts as the year of onset.The operationalization of the measure is dichotomous, considering whether or not at least one armed conflict began in the year. It is also necessary to control for a number of other factors that could potentially influence the onset of coups or civil conflict.The lead of Fearon and Laitin is followed in modeling the onset of civil conflict.Polity accounts for a state's level of democratization.
LowGDP per capita (logged) has been argued to act as a determinant of civil war for a number of reasons. These causes range from the ability of insurgencies to recruit from poorer classes to improving the "state military and police strength relative to the potential insurgents." 20 An advantage of the current argument is to account for a mechanism (coup-proofing) that can actually decrease the relative power of the state. The natural log of population is also included, as a larger populace has been argued to increase the pool of potential recruits as well as increase the costs of government monitoring. Terrain captures the percent of mountainous terrain within a state's borders and can reduce the ability of central authorities to project power. Countries with non-contiguous territories (e.g., colonial wars, Angola and Cabinda) have also been noted to be particularly conflict prone due to the separation of the territory from the state's power center.
Oil exporters are states whose exports are at least 30% oil. The measure has been an oft-cited contributor to civil conflict, particularly in literature concerning the resource course. Instability captures a polity score change of at least 2 units and can capture "disorganization and weakness" of the state. 21 Ethnic and religious fractionalization intend to capture the potential for identitybased hostility. Finally, the existence of prior incidence of conflict in the previous year seeks to account for a new conflict's dependence on a prior event.
There are, however, two notable changes from the original Fearon and Laitin model.
First, new state, a variable that captures whether a state is in its first two years of independence, is omitted due to perfect collinearity. Second, a control for a coup in the current year is included. 22 Coups can both act as the first shots fired in a civil conflict or can act as a contributing factor to a future civil war (e.g., 2002 Cote d'Iviore). Further, "bloody" coups with a body count of at least 25 deaths can in fact be classified as a civil conflict in the Armed Conflict Dataset. Thyne, for example, has urged scholars to include coups as a control variable for civil war studies for just these reasons. 23 Coups are considered to be "illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive,"
as defined by Powell and Thyne. 24 This dataset is particularly attractive given their effort to distinguish coup activity from other forms of anti-regime actions, including civil war. This variable is a dichotomous measure that considers whether or not at least one coup was attempted during the year.
Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, logistic regression is employed as an estimator. 25 A variety of steps are taken to consider the robustness of the models, with each step reflected in each model in 
RESULTS
The observed association between coup-proofing and civil conflict is reported in Table 1 .
Each model reflects a logistic regression that implements a different approach to assuring robustness of the results.Coup-proofing is significantly additive to the onset of civil conflict in each specification, a relationship that is illustrated through the use of predicted probabilities in Figure 1 . Holding other variables at their median, countries ranking one on the Pilster and Bohmelt measure for effective ground organizations have a 1.1% probability for the onset of a conflict in a given year. This increases to 1.8% at two organizations, 3.2% at three organizations, and 5.9% at four. A modest change from one to two organizations increases the predicted probability of civil conflict by 64%, while increasing from one to three nearly triples the likelihood (a 191% increase). demonstrated that purging ethnic groups from the government can increase the mobilizational capacity of insurgents. Though similar data are likely never to be available for the armed forces, the consequences of soldier purges can clearly be expected to follow a similar, if not stronger, trend. Further, when conducted along ethnic lines, such purges will also act to increase grouplevel grievances against the state, thereby increasing the willingness to rebel.
A glance at the control variables reveals that the occurrence of a coup attempt in the current year is also an important part of the civil conflict story, with coup-free states displaying a predicted conflict onset probability of 1.3%, while a coup-afflicted state sees a probability of 7.7%. To be clear, this rate is likely exaggerated, even if slightly. As noted earlier, a number of the conflicts accounted for bthe dependent variable can specifically trace their roots to coups.
Consequently, it is important to distinguish that in the current models we are merely witnessing association between coups and civil conflict instead of coups acting as a catalyst of a distinct event. While there are important theoretical reasons to believe coups can help promote civil wars, the current state of the data limit such a conclusion.
Terrain displayed the expected positive sign in each specification, while increased religious fractionalization was found to be a robust negative influence on conflict onset. Though this is in contrast to the common assumption that multiple identities promote strife, Horowitz has suggested that states with highly fractionalized identities, particularly those with numerous small groups, will experience less conflict due to coalition-building. Trouble arises, he argues, when one major group faces competition from a competing, though demonstrably less powerful, group.
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Other controls were poor predictors of conflict. This is not to say that factors such as level of democratization or economic wealth are not an important part of the conflict story. Such factors could be crucial components of specific conflicts and could still be a more generalizable cause of the dependent variable. The models demonstratedthat the poorer states in the sample
were not statistically more likely to face conflict onset than wealthier states. It is important to be clear that the analysis is limited to a sample of African cases. So while statistical explorations such as the influential work of Fearon and Laitin find wealth to be consistently significant in a global sample, the current study's focus on Africa inevitably limits its scope to a population of cases that are largely at lower levels of economic development than the sample utilized in global studies. In other words, though a wealthier state in Africa may not face better conflict prospects that a slightly poorer African state, both of those states are potentially worse off than the far more developed countries elsewhere in the world (e.g., Europe, North America).
CONCLUSIONS
Though civil wars will continue, self-interested leaders can-and usually will-maintain 
